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Abstract 
 
The present study investigates the effects of family control on the value of 
corporate cash holdings. Using a large sample of French listed firms, the results show 
that the value of excess cash reserves is lower in family firms than in other firms, 
reflecting investors’ concern about the potential misuse of cash by controlling families. 
We also find that the value of excess cash is lower when controlling families are involved 
in management and when they maintain a grip on control, indicating that investors do 
not expect the efficient use of cash in these firms. Our findings are consistent with the 
argument that the extent to which excess cash contributes to firm value is lower when 
dominant shareholders are likely to expropriate firm resources. Overall, family control 
seems to be a key determinant of cash valuation when ownership is concentrated. 
 
JEL classification: G32; G34; M41 
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1. Introduction 
The recent corporate finance literature documents that the extent to which cash 
holdings contribute to firm value, that is, the value of cash holdings, depends on the 
costs and benefits of hoarding cash. The seminal paper of Pinkowitz and 
Williamson (2004) suggests that the value that investors place on cash reflects their 
perception of the way cash is managed. The value of additional cash increases when 
investors are optimistic about the efficient use of liquid resources. Cash is, however, 
valued at a discount when it is likely to be misused. Faulkender and Wang (2006) argue 
that when firms have investment opportunities but face financial constraints, cash 
should be more valuable to investors since it lessens the need to raise costly external 
finance. 
The present paper investigates the value of cash holdings in France, where a large 
proportion of listed firms are family firms. Boubaker et al. (2013) report that family firms 
represent 77.78% of non-financial French listed firms. Members of the controlling family 
are part of the top management team in large part of these firms (Faccio and Lang, 2002; 
Boubaker, 2007). This study revisits the agency implications of corporate cash holdings 
by examining the effect of family corporate control on the value of excess cash reserves. 
Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) suggest that cash exceeding the needs of the firm 
potentially raises important agency problems when it is not disbursed to shareholders 
because it gives insiders opportunities to extract private benefits. These problems are 
exacerbated in the absence of capital market scrutiny, increasing the likelihood of 
expropriation of liquid resources(Myers and Rajan, 1998). 
The value that investors place in excessive amounts of cash depends on the 
quality of corporate governance. The role of family ownership and family involvement 
in corporate management in corporate governance is still unclear. On the one hand, the 
presence of controlling families could have a disciplinary role given their ability to 
monitor management and their long-term commitment to the firm (Anderson and 
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Reeb, 2003; Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; Barontini and Caprio, 2006). 1 On the other hand, 
controlling families, as dominant shareholders, have incentives to engage in empire 
building and the extraction of private benefits, particularly when their ownership gives 
them almost full control of the firm. 
Using a sample of 3,233 French listed firms over 1998–2007, we find that the value 
of excess cash in family firms is lower than half of that in other firms. When a family firm 
is managed by a member of the controlling family, the value of its excess cash is lower 
than one-third that in other firms. Additional analysis shows that cash valuation declines 
with the family’s control rights. Taken together, our results indicate that controlling 
families contribute to increasing agency costs. These agency costs are more important 
when families hold substantial control rights or when they are involved in the firm’s 
management, since they are better able to convert firm resources to their own benefits 
and thereby expropriate minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999; Villalonga and 
Amit, 2009). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and research 
design. Section 4 exposes summary statistics. Sections 5 and 6 report the empirical 
results. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Related literature and hypotheses development 
2.1. Agency problems and value of cash holdings 
There is vast evidence that corporate cash holdings are conducive to important 
agency problems. Harford (1999), for instance, show that cash-rich firms are less likely to 
pay dividends but more prone to engage in value-destroying acquisitions. In a cross-
country study, Dittmar et al. (2003) find that cash levels are negatively related to the 
country’s degree of investor protection. Harford et al. (2008) argue that, when corporate 
governance is weak, excess cash leads to inefficient investments and lower firm value. 
                                                          
1 “The [family] company is an inheritance to be protected and handed on. It is the outcome of the next 
and each generation’s commitment to the last”. Betts, Paul. “Family Companies Are Ready for the 
Worst.” Financial Times (London), October 3, 2001. 
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Shareholders of firms with large cash balances may be concerned, in the presence of 
agency problems, about the misuse of cash, which may lower the value of cash, 
particularly when corporate governance is weak. Pinkowitz et al. (2006) consistently find 
that firms in countries with weak investor protection exhibit lower values of cash than 
their counterparts in countries with strong investor protection do. Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith (2007) establish that the value of an additional dollar of cash holdings in firms 
with poor governance is practically half that in firms with good governance. Masulis et 
al. (2009) claim that the divergence of insiders’ control rights and cash flow rights 
adversely affects cash valuation. Similarly, Belkhir et al. (2014) document a negative 
effect of excess control rights on the value of cash holdings and provide evidence of the 
disciplinary role of independent boards and the separation of chief executive officer 
(CEO) and chairperson positions. Frésard and Salva (2010) point out that cash is more 
valuable in US cross-listed firms, where the risk of being expropriated by insiders is low. 
Haw et al. (2011) show that firms whose payouts are wholly comprised of share 
repurchases exhibit lower values of cash than do firms whose payouts are comprised 
exclusively of dividends, since dividends have a more effective corporate governance 
role. Tong (2011) examines diversification strategies and shows that, compared to 
investors of single-segment firms, those of diversified firms assign lower values to cash 
holdings because of the presence of important agency conflicts in conglomerate 
structures. 
2.2. Hypotheses development 
2.2.1. Family firms and the value of excess cash 
Although family firms are widespread around the world, the governance role of 
controlling families remains controversial. The results of the empirical research 
examining the effect of family control on agency costs are mixed. A number of studies, 
including those of Anderson and Reeb (2003), Maury (2006) and Villalonga and Amit 
(2006), document that family control reduces agency problems, given that the controlling 
families are likely to be underdiversified and to have major financial interests in the firm. 
Moreover, controlling families predominately have a long-term commitment to the firm, 
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such that they are willing to preserve reputational capital and thereby act in ways that 
maximize shareholder value (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006).2 The controlling families, as 
dominant shareholders, are also predisposed to effectively monitor management 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2009). Given these elements, family-controlled firms are more 
inclined to outperform their nonfamily counterparts. 
To the extent that the presence of controlling families is associated with reduced 
agency problems, investors are expected to place a higher value on cash held by family 
firms than on that held by other firms. We therefore formulate the following hypothesis. 
H1a: The value of excess cash holdings is higher in family-controlled firms than in other 
firms. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) show that the performance of family firms is lower at 
high ownership levels. They explain their result as indicating family ownership is 
harmful for minority shareholders when control is highly concentrated. Holderness and 
Sheehan (1988) consistently find that family firms exhibit lower performance than 
dispersed ownership firms do. La Porta et al. (1999) advance that families with 
substantial control over firms are more inclined to adopt self-serving behavior and 
extract private benefits at the expense of outside investors. In support of this view, 
Faccio et al. (2001) claim that controlling families that are politically connected are 
deemed to expropriate minority shareholders, particularly in environments that favor 
the entrenchment of such families. Yeh and Woidtke (2005) show that controlling 
families are more prone to appoint board members who are affiliated with them, even if 
incompetent or underqualified, resulting in lower firm value. 
To the extent that family firms exhibit a higher risk of minority shareholder 
expropriation, the availability of excess cash holdings is expected to increase investors’ 
concerns about the discretionary use of these funds, lowering their value. One testable 
                                                          
2 In his analysis of France’s corporate history, Murphy (2005) shows, through the examples of 
Michelin, L’Oréal, and Peugeot, that many French families continue to hold large stakes in their 
business many decades since incorporation owing to reliance on self-financing rather than borrowing 
from the financial markets and the strong involvement in management of the founding family 
members and their heirs. 
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implication is that the presence of controlling families is associated with a lower 
valuation of excess cash. We hence advance the following hypothesis. 
H1b: The value of excess cash holdings is lower in family-controlled firms than in other 
firms. 
2.2.2. Family involvement in management and the value of excess cash 
A number of studies, including those of La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. 
(2000), provide evidence that the controlling owners of East Asian and Western 
European firms are active in their management. Anderson and Reeb (2003) argue that 
holding executive positions strengthens the influence of controlling owners over their 
firms. Jaggi et al. (2007) show that controlling families routinely appoint one of their 
members as chair of the board of directors to maintain authority over board 
interventions, which usually leads to agency problems. Kalcheva and Lins (2007) 
consistently show that investors downgrade the marginal value of an incremental dollar 
of cash from $0.76 to $0.39 when firms are managed by the largest shareholder, 
compared to their peers with professional managers. They explain that hiring 
professional managers is more advantageous in terms of objectivity and accountability to 
shareholders because these managers can deter the likely expropriation behavior of the 
controlling shareholders. 
To the extent that the involvement of the controlling family in management is 
conducive to greater agency problems, investors will discount the value of excess cash in 
firms managed by controlling owners. This line of reasoning leads to the following 
hypothesis. 
H2: The value of excess cash holdings is lower when members of the controlling family are 
involved in management than when they are not. 
3. Methodology and data 
3.1. Sample description and data sources 
Our starting sample consists of all French listed firms that are available in the 
Worldscope database over 1998–2007. Consistent with previous studies, we eliminate 
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financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999) and regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900–4999), since 
they are subject to special regulatory requirements. We also exclude firms for which 
ownership and financial data are missing. We are left with 4,486 firm–year observations. 
Following previous literature such as Drobetz et al. (2010) and Frésard and Salva (2010), 
we omit the 1,253 observations of firms having negative excess cash. Our final sample 
consists of 3,233 firm–year observations covering the period from 1998 to 2007. All of the 
financial variables used in the analysis are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to 
minimize the impact of outliers. Financial data are retrieved from the Worldscope 
database. Corporate governance data are manually collected from firms’ annual reports 
that are available on the Autorité des Marchés Financiers website or on corporate websites. 
 
3.2. Construction of the excess cash variable 
According to Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), excess cash is “cash reserves 
exceeding those needed for operations and investment”. Opler et al. (1999) develop an 
empirical model estimating the normal level of cash that a firm needs in its operating 
activities and for its investment opportunities. Their model includes a number of firm 
characteristics, including firm size, that gauge a firm’s ability to obtain external finance; 
cash flow to proxy for financial constraints; net working capital, which is considered a 
substitute for liquid assets; and cash flow volatility, which indicates the extent of 
hedging needs. The model also includes investment opportunities, financial distress 
costs as proxied by research and development (R&D), leverage, capital expenditures, and 
dividends. Excess cash is obtained as the residual term of the following model  
Ln(Cash/NetAssets)i,t=β0+β1Ln(RealNetAssets)i,t+β2CashFlow/NetAssetsi,t+β3NWC/NetAsseti,t    
    
                              +β4STD CFi+β5MarketValue/NetAssetsi,t+β6R&D-to-salesi,t 
                              +β7Leveragei,t +β8CAPEXi,t/NetAssetsi,t+β9Dividummyi,t 
                               +β10Regulatedummyi,t  +  Industrydum +α i+εi,t ,                               (Eq.1) 
where Ln(Cash/NetAssets) is the natural logarithm of cash to net assets, Cash is 
cash and marketable securities, and NetAssets is non-cash assets, measured as the book 
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value of total assets minus cash and marketable securities. Ln(RealNetAssets) is a proxy of 
firm size. It is computed as the natural logarithm of NetAssets in 2007 euros, adjusted for 
inflation using the French consumer price index series. CashFlow is cash flow, computed 
as operating income minus interest and taxes. NWC is net working capital, computed as 
current assets minus current liabilities minus cash. STD CF is the industry average of the 
prior five-year standard deviation of cash flow to net assets, where industry is defined 
according to Campbell’s (1996) classification. MarketValue/NetAssets is the market-to-
book ratio, where MarketValue is computed as the market value of equity plus total 
liabilities. MarketValue is instrumented by the three-year lagged sales growth. R&D-to-
sales is research and development expenses deflated by Sales, where Sales is total sales. 
Leverage is total debt scaled by the book value of total assets; CAPEX is capital 
expenditure; Dividummy is a dummy variable that equals one when the firm pays 
dividends, and zero otherwise. Regulatedummy is a dummy variable that equals one 
when a firm belongs to a regulated industry (railroads (SIC code 4011), trucking (SIC 
codes 4210, 4213), airlines (SIC code 4512), and telecommunications (SIC codes 4812, 
4813)), and zero otherwise. Industrydum denotes industry dummy variables, following 
Campbell’s (1996) classification. αi, refers to firm fixed effects. i and t are subscripts 
denoting firm and time, respectively. Model Eq.(1) is estimated as a pooled OLS 
regression with robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity. The estimation 
results are provided in the Appendix. 
3.3. Research design 
The value of excess cash reflects the extent to which cash exceeding a firm’s needs 
affects investors’ valuation of the firm. To estimate this effect, we modify the model of 
Fama and French (1998) suggesting that firm value depends on earnings, research and 
development (R&D) expenses, dividends and interest expenses, past and future changes 
in these variables, past and future changes in total assets, and future change in the firm’s 
market value. To gauge the contribution of cash holdings to the firm’s value, we follow 
Pinkowitz et al. (2006) and subsequent related studies (Dittmar and Mart-Smith, 2007; 
Frésard and Salva, 2010; Drobetz et al. 2010) and decompose the variable on total assets 
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into cash and non-cash components (i.e., excess cash and net assets). We then interact the 
variable on excess cash with corporate governance variables to obtain the following 
baseline model 
Vi,t = β0 + β1EXCASHi,t + β2GOVi,t*EXCASHi,t + β3GOVi,t + β4EARNi,t + β5∆EARNi,t                            
+ β6∆EARNi,t+1 + β7∆NAi,t + β8∆NAi,t+1 + β9INTi,t + β10∆INTi,t + β11∆INTi,t+1 + β12R&Di,t                  
+  β13∆R&Di,t  + β14∆R&Di,t+1 + β15DIVi,t + β16∆DIVi,t + β17∆DIVi,t+1 + β18∆Vi,t+1 + α i, +  µt            
+ εi,t ,                                                                                                                                        (Eq. 2) 
where V is the market value of the firm. V is computed as the market value of 
equity plus the book value of total debt. EARN is earnings before interest and 
extraordinary items (after depreciation and taxes) deflated by NA;3 R&D is R&D 
expenses deflated by NA; Dividends is common dividends deflated by NA; ∆Xt is the 
change in variable X from year t-1 to year t, and ∆Xt+1 is the change in variable X from 
year t to year t+1. EXCASH is excess cash holdings, computed as the residuals of model 
Eq. (1) predicting the normal level of cash holdings. GOV is the corporate governance 
variables that are: (1) FAMILY is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the ultimate 
controlling owner of the firm is a family, and zero otherwise. We use the procedure of 
Faccio and Lang (2002) to identify the ultimate owner of a firm. (2) FAMILY_MANAG is 
a dichotomous variable that equals one if the CEO, chairman, honorary chairman, or 
vice-chairman is a member of the controlling family, and zero otherwise. α i, and µt refer 
to firm- and time- fixed effects, respectively. i and t are subscripts denoting firm and 
time, respectively. 
The coefficient β1 estimates the contribution of excess cash to firm value. The 
coefficient β2 of the interaction term estimates the effect of the governance variable on the 
value of excess cash. A positive sign for this coefficient indicates that the corporate 
governance characteristic enhances the value of excess cash, whereas a negative sign 
indicates an adverse effect of the characteristic on cash valuation. 
                                                          
3 See, e.g., Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). 
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4. Summary statistics and correlations 
Table 1 presents the main characteristics of the sample firms. Panel A reports key 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study. The evidence in Panel A shows 
that about 76% of the sample firms are family firms, consistent with prior studies in the 
French context (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Boubaker et al. 2013). The mean (median) value of 
the control rights of the controlling family is 51.10% (54.36%). Members of these families 
have executive positions in 72.02% (54.71%/75.97%) of family firms. Excess cash 
represents, on average, 2.27% of net assets. The median ratio of excess cash to net assets 
is 2.4%. Panel B presents the distribution of firms by industry. The results show that 
consumer durables and services are the most represented industries in our sample, with, 
respectively, 19.89% and 19.61% of the sample firms, while the petroleum industry is the 
least represented industry, with only 0.87% of sample firms. 
Table 2 reports the pairwise correlation coefficients of the variables in the model 
of Fama and French (1998). The results show that excess cash is positively correlated 
with firm value. Earnings, R&D, dividends, and growth in net assets (except for levels of 
R&D and past change of dividends) also have positive correlations with firm value, 
whereas interests and change in firm value exhibit negative correlations. These findings 
are, overall, consistent with the predictions of Fama and French (1998). We compute the 
variance inflation factor to assess the severity of multicollinearity among independent 
variables. The corresponding values are weak and range between 1.28 and 3.70, 
suggesting that multicollinearity is not a serious issue in our study. 
5. Multivariate analysis 
This section provides the empirical analysis of the effect of family control on the 
value of excess cash. The results are reported in Table 3 (Panel A). In all columns, excess 
cash is computed as the residuals of the model of Opler et al. (1999), as detailed in the 
Appendix. 
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5.1. The normal level of cash holdings 
The Appendix reports the results of estimating the normal level of cash using the 
model of Opler et al. (1999). Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) note that the market-to-
book ratio included in this model implies an endogeneity problem, given that 
investment opportunities can, in turn, be determined by cash levels. We follow their 
methodology by using the three year-lagged sales growth as an instrument for the 
market-to-book ratio. The two first columns of the Appendix report the results of the 
first-stage estimation of a reduced form of the model of Opler et al. (1999). 4 We find that 
the instrument—three-year sales growth—has a strong positive effect on the market-to-
book ratio. The two last columns of the Appendix report the results of the second-stage 
equation. The results show that the level of cash increases with the instrumented 
investment opportunities, cash flow, cash flow volatility, and R&D and it decreases with 
firm size, net working capital, leverage, and capital expenditure, consistent with Opler et 
al. (1999) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). 
5.2.  Family control and the value of excess cash 
5.2.1. Presence of a controlling family 
The first column in Table 3 (Panel A) reports the results of the effect of family firms 
on the value of excess cash. We first note a positive coefficient for EXCASH (0.2634) that 
is statistically significant at the 1% level, meaning that excess cash holdings contribute 
positively to firm value. The coefficient of the interaction term EXCASH*FAMILY 
(-0.1481) is negative at the 1% statistical level, indicating that the value of excess cash is 
significantly lower in family firms compared to that in other firms. Economically, the 
value of excess cash declines by more than half (56.22%) when firms are controlled by 
families than when they are not. 5 This indicates that investors seem to be concerned 
about the presence of cash exceeding a firm’s needs when a family controls the firm, 
                                                          
4 The reduced form of the Opler et al.’s (1999) model excludes the variables leverage, capital 
expenditures, dividends and regulated industries. 
5 56.22%=[(0.2634 - 0.1481)-0.2634]/0.2634 
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which is consistent with H1b, suggesting that agency problems are likely to be more 
important in family firms. 
Overall, the control variables are found to significantly affect firm value, in 
conformity with prior relevant studies such as Drobetz et al. (2010) and Haw et al. (2011). 
Thus, current levels of earnings and past and future changes of earnings and R&D 
expenses exhibit positive coefficients, suggesting that better profitability and more 
intensive R&D activities contribute to firm value. Level and future change of dividends 
similarly positively affect firm value, while the negative sign of past change of dividends 
is consistent with Pinkowitz et al. (2006). Current level and past and future changes of 
interest exhibit negative coefficients, meaning that greater interest expenses negatively 
affect firm value. Consistent with the findings of Fama and French (1998), the results 
show that future change in firm value—capturing unexpected effects of the omitted 
variables—exhibits a negative coefficient and that future change of net assets has a 
positive effect on firm value. The explanatory power of the model ranges from 13.62% to 
25.42%, indicating the relevance of the variables used in explaining firm value. 
5.2.2. Involvement of the controlling family in management 
To investigate the extent to which the controlling family’s involvement in 
management affects investors’ valuation of excess cash, we estimate our baseline model 
Eq. (2) by using the variable FAMILY_MANAG, which is a dummy variable that equals 
one if at least one member of the controlling family is the CEO, chair, honorary chair, or 
vice-chair and zero otherwise. The estimation results are reported in Columns (2) and (3) 
of Table 3 (Panel A) for the full sample and the family firm sample, respectively. In 
Column (2), the coefficient of the interaction term EXCASH * FAMILY_MANAG is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that investors are more 
likely to decrease the value of excess cash when members of the controlling family are 
involved in management, compared to when family firms are run by professional 
managers. For family firms, the value of excess cash is decreased by about 71.05%.6 
                                                          
6 71.05%=[(0.1907 – 0.1355)-0.1907)]/0.1907 
  
13 
 
Overall, our findings indicate that investors are more concerned about the use of 
cash that exceeds the firm’s needs when the controlling family participates in 
management, resulting in a lower value of cash holdings. 
5.3 Additional analysis: The effect of the family’s control rights 
Large shareholders are prone to mitigating the traditional agency problem caused 
by the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, when 
large shareholders gain nearly full control of a firm, they are more willing to favor their 
own interests by consuming private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders 
(Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988). Greater control rights thus seem to 
be associated with increased agency costs. 
We test this proposition by examining the implications of the control rights of 
controlling families on the contribution of excess cash to firm value. We introduce the 
variable FAMILY_CONT, measured as the percentage of control rights (both direct and 
indirect) held by the controlling family. We use the weakest link principle adopted by 
Faccio and Lang (2002), which measures the aggregate control rights of the ultimate 
owner as the sum of the weakest links along the different control chains.7 The results 
from Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 (Panel B) indicate that control rights held by controlling 
families negatively affect the value of excess cash. This suggests that the consumption of 
private benefits is more likely in the presence of greater control rights. 
6. Conclusion 
The free cash flow hypothesis suggests that self-interested insiders are inclined to use 
cash exceeding the firm’s needs for private purposes (Jensen, 1986). Investors are hence 
concerned about the potential misuse of corporate cash holdings, leading to a lower 
value of this cash, particularly when corporate governance is weak. 
The present study investigates how family control affects the value of excess cash 
holdings in French listed firms. We find that the value of excess cash declines by more 
                                                          
7 Control chains are traced up by considering the variety of control-enhancing mechanisms that exist 
in France, namely, pyramid structures, non-voting shares, and double voting shares 
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than half when the controlling owner is a family compared to when it is not, suggesting 
the investors do not expect that cash will be managed inefficiently in family firms. The 
results also indicate that the value of excess cash is nearly two-thirds lower in firms 
where the controlling family is involved in management than in other firms. An 
additional analysis shows that greater control rights in the hands of the controlling 
family are associated with a lower value of excess cash, suggesting severe agency 
problems associated with a strong family grip on control. 
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Appendix. Results of regressions predicting the normal level of cash holdings    
This table reports the regression results for the level of cash holdings using the model of 
Opler et al. (1999). Dependent variable of the model of Opler et al. (1999) is the level of cash. 
It is measured as the natural logarithm of cash-to-net assets (Ln(Cash/NetAssets)). Cash is cash 
and marketable securities. NetAssets is non-cash assets. It is measured as the book value of 
total assets minus cash and marketable securities. The regressors include Ln(realNetAssets) 
which proxies for firm size. It is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets minus 
cash and marketable securities in 2007 euros, adjusted for inflation using the French 
consumer price index (CPI) series; CashFlow/Net Assets is cash flow computed as operating 
income minus interest and taxes, deflated by NetAssets; NWC/NetAssets is net working capital 
computed as current assets minus current liabilities minus cash, deflated by NetAssets; STD 
CF  is standard deviation of cash flow computed as industry average of prior 5 year standard 
deviation of cash flow to net assets, where industry is defined according to Campbell’s (1996) 
industry classification; MarketValue/NetAssets is market-to-book ratio where MarketValue is 
market value computed as market value of equity plus total liabilities. R&D-to-sales is 
research and development expenses deflated by Sales, where Sales is total sales; Leverage is 
total debt scaled by book value of total assets; CAPEX/NetAssets is capital expenditure, 
deflated by NetAssets; Dividummy is a dummy that equals one when a firm pays dividends, 
and zero otherwise. Regulatedummy is a dummy that equals one when a firm belongs to a 
regulated industry, and zero otherwise. Model of Opler et al. (1999) is estimated as OLS 
regression with industry dummies and robust standard errors. It is estimated using an 
instrumental variable approach with three-year lagged sales growth (Three-year Sales Growth) 
as an instrument for MarketValue/NetAssets. The results of the first stage of the instrumental 
variable model (MarketValue/NetAssets as dependent variable) are reported in the right side 
of the table. All models include year dummies. a, b and c denote two-tailed statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses next to the estimated coefficients. 
Variable                               First-stage 
                   (1) 
Model of Opler et al.(1999) 
(2) 
Ln(realNetAssets) -1.2367   (-18.83)a   Ln(realNetAssets) -0.4070 (-13.04)a 
CashFlow/ 
NetAssets 1.7348 (8.99)
a CashFlow/NetAssets 0.5091 (5.48)
a 
   NWC/NetAssets -0.1418 (-5.83)a 
NWC/NetAssets -0.9608   (-18.73)a          STD CF 0.4539 (4.45)a 
STD CF 0.6799   (3.45)a      MarketValue/ 
NetAssets 
0.0006 (2.00)b 
Three-year Sales 
Growth 0.0209 (29.33)
a R&D-to-sales 2.0833 (7.63)
a 
   Leverage -0.1667 (-2.27)b 
R&D-to-sales    1.8887    (3.07)a      CAPEX/NetAssets -1.0275 (-3.31)a 
Intercept 16.7698 (21.02) a Dividummy 0.0580 (1.57) 
   Regulatedummy -0.1089 (-0.14) 
   Intercept 0.7010 (1.24)     
Year dummies                   Yes Year dummies Yes 
Industry dummies                    No Industry dummies Yes 
Nb.observations                                        4,486 Nb.observations 4,486 
 R-squared                                         64,25% R-squared 18.24% 
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Table 1- Summary statistics 
This table provides summary statistics. Panel A presents descriptive statistics of the variable used. FAMILY is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the 
controlling shareholder is a family, and zero otherwise. FAMILY_MANAG is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the CEO, chairman, honorary 
chairman, or vice-chairman is a member of the controlling family. FAMILY_CONT is the percentage of control rights (both direct and indirect) held by the 
controlling family. EXCASH is excess cash holdings. It is the residual of the model of Opler et al. (1999) in Appendix. V is market value of the ﬁrm. It is 
computed as the market value of equity plus book value of total debt. NA is non-cash assets. It is measured as the book value of total assets minus cash and 
marketable securities. EARN is earnings before interest and extraordinary items (after depreciation and taxes) deflated by NA. R&D is research and 
development expense deflated by NA. INT is interest expense deflated by NA. DIV is common dividends deflated by NA. ∆Xt is the change in variable X from 
year t-1 to year t. ∆Xt+1 is the change in variable X from year t to year t+1. Panel B reports the distribution of firms by industry. N is the number of 
observations. 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics Panel B. Distribution of firms by industry  
Variable Mean 
25th 
percentile Median 
75th 
percentile 
Standard 
Deviation 
Industry  Two-digit SIC codes N % 
FAMILY 0.7597   1.000 1.000 1.000 0.4219   1 Petroleum 13, 29 28 0,87  
FAMILY_MANAG 0.5471   0.000 1.000 1.000 0.4978 2 Consumer durables 25, 30, 36, 37, 50, 55, 57 643 19,89  
FAMILY_CONT 0.5110 0.2937 0.5436 0.7171 0.2605 3 Basic industry 10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 28, 33 371 11,48  
EXCASHt 0.0277 -0.2891 0.0240 0.0500 0.2340 4 Food and tobacco 1, 2, 9, 20, 21, 54 222 6,87  
Vt 1.8705 1.0740 1.3713 1.8977 1.5123 5 Construction 15, 16, 17, 32, 52 164 5,07  
EARNt 0.0132 0.0062 0.0345 0.0654 0.1919 6 Capital goods 34, 35, 38 359 11,10  
∆EARNt 0.0105 -0.0112 0.0063 0.0245 0.2294 7 Transportation 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47 117 3,62  
∆EARNt+1 0.0130 -0.0168 0.0053 0.0257 0.2325 8 Utilities 46, 48 145 4,48  
∆NAt 0.0467 -0.0357 0.0526 0.1584 0.2939 9 Textiles and trade 22, 23, 31, 51, 53, 56, 59 349 10,79  
∆NAt+1 0.1621 -0.0413 0.0486 0.1702 0.0112 10 Services 72, 73, 75, 76, 80, 82, 87, 89 634 19,61  
R&Dt 0.0184 0.000 0.000 0.0030 0.0657 11 Leisure 27, 58, 70, 78, 79 201 6,22  
∆R&Dt 0.0028 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0455 Total  3,233 100 
∆R&Dt+1 0.0024 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0537     
INTt 0.0148 0.0057 0.0118 0.0193 0.0226  
∆INTt -0.0007 -0.0020 0.0022 0.0032 0.1002     
∆INTt+1 0.0020 -0.0019 0.0002 0.0035 0.0549     
DIV 0.0143 0.000 0.0073 0.0165 0.0620     
∆DIVt 0.0015 0.000 0.000 0.0025 0.0747     
∆DIVt+1 0.0021 0.000 0.000 0.0028 0.0772     
∆Vt+1 0.1267 -0.1848 0.0332 0.2672 0.5071     
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Table 2. Correlations  
This table presents the coefficients of correlation between the various financial variables. EXCASH is excess cash holdings. It is the residual of the model of Opler et al. (1999) in 
Appendix. V is market value of the ﬁrm. It is computed as the market value of equity plus book value of total debt. NA is non-cash assets. It is measured as the book value of total assets 
minus cash and marketable securities. EARN is earnings before interest and extraordinary items (after depreciation and taxes) deflated by NA. R&D is research and development expense 
deflated by NA. INT is interest expense deflated by NA. DIV is common dividends deflated by NA. ∆Xt is the change in variable X from year t-1 to year t. ∆Xt+1 is the change in variable X 
from year t to year t+1. a, b, and c indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variable Vt EXCASHt Earnt ∆Earnt ∆Earnt+1 ∆NAt ∆NAt+1 RDt ∆RDt ∆RDt+1 Div ∆Divt ∆Divt+1 Intt ∆Intt ∆Intt+1 ∆Vt+1 
Vt 1                 
EXCASHt 0.245a 1                
EARNt 0.253a 0.035b 1               
∆EARNt 0.133a 0.120a 0.0013 1              
∆EARNt+1 0.129a -0.091a -0.44a -0.18a 1             
∆NAt 0.073a -0.1275 0.5992 -0.750 -0.1150c 1            
∆NAt+1 0.118a 0.0577a -0.024b 0.6108b 0.1705b -0.003 1           
R&Dt 0.288a 0.050b -0.021 -0.002 0.0028 0.0014 -0.000 1          
∆R&Dt 0.130a 0.0084 -0.007 -0.004 -0.010 0.0028b 0.0007 0.446a 1         
∆R&Dt+1 0.191a 0.0498 0.0034 0.0019 -0.007 0.0034 0.0010c 0.0927b -0.01a 1        
DIVt 0.184a 0.048a 0.0291 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 0.0337c 0.0135b -0.001 -0.004 1       
∆DIVt -0.080 c -0.0057 0.0041 -0.001 0.0008 -0.024 0.0035b 0.0078 -0.003 0.0005 0.6379 1      
∆DIVt+1 0.026 0.0662 0.0097 0.0001 0.0006 0.000 0.273a 0.0062 0.002b .0006 -0.590 -0.482 1     
INTt -0.042b -0.0328 0.367a 0.140a -0.09a 0.0112 0.0001 -0.006 -0.004 0.0022c -0.005 -0.001 0.000 1    
∆INTt -0.041a -0.062a 0.410a 0.070a -0.18a 0.011b 0.003c -0.003 -0.003 0.001c -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.96b 1   
∆INTt+1 -0.050a 0.1235 -0.386 0.0271 0.1264c 0.0136b -0.003b 0.0035 0.0010 0.001 b 0.0047 0.0008 0.000 -0.978c -0.976b 1  
∆Vt+1 -0.859a 0.0663 -0.008 0.2730 0.1012 c -0.050 0.994b 0.0219 -0.016 -0.009 -0.005 -0.007 0.0001 0.0337 0.342c -0.001 1 
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Table 3.  Family control the value of excess cash 
This table reports results of fixed effect regressions of family involvement in control and management 
on the value of excess cash. Panel A reports main findings. Panel B reports additional analysis. 
Dependent variable is the market value of the ﬁrm, denoted as Vt. It is computed as the market value 
of equity plus book value of total debt. NA is non-cash assets. It is measured as the book value of total 
assets minus cash and marketable securities. EARN is earnings before interest and extraordinary items 
(after depreciation and taxes) deflated by NA. R&D is research and development expense deflated by 
NA. INT is interest expense deflated by NA. DIV is common dividends deflated by NA. ∆Xt is the 
change in variable X from year t-1 to year t. ∆Xt+1 is the change in variable X from year t to year t+1. 
FAMILY is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the controlling shareholder is a family, and zero 
otherwise. FAMILY_MANAG is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the CEO, chairman, 
honorary chairman, or vice-chairman is a member of the controlling family.  FAMILY_CONT is the 
percentage of control rights (both direct and indirect) held by the controlling family. The t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses below to the estimated coefficients. a, b and c denote two-tailed statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Main analysis Panel B. Additional 
analysis 
Variable 
Full sample 
(1) 
Full sample 
(2) 
Family 
firms 
(3) 
Full sample 
(1) 
Family 
firms 
(2) 
EXCASHt 0.2634 
(6.27)a 
0.1548 
(3.90)a 
0.1907 
(3.38)a 
0.2405 
(2.78)a 
0.3063 
(2.10)b  
FAMILY -0.2912 
(-3.92)a 
    
EXCASHt*FAMILY -0.1481 
(-2.99)a   
    
FAMILY_MANAG  -0.1049 
(-1.32) 
-0.0285 
(-0.30) 
  
EXCASHt* FAMILY_MANAG  -0.1023 
(-2.11)b 
-0.1355 
(-2.16)b 
  
FAMILY_CONT    0.2982 
(1.18) 
0.3549 
(0.81) 
EXCASHt* FAMILY_CONT    -0.2939 
(-2.02)b 
-0.5991 
(-1.97)b 
EARNt 2.3374 
(10.90)a 
1.4498 
(11.29)a 
2.3895  
(13.14)a 
3.9356 
(10.31)a 
4.3001 
(12.00)a 
∆EARNt 0.0090    
(0.09) 
0.0601 
(0.87) 
-0.1545 
(-2.06)b 
0.4174 
(3.63)a  
0.2259 
(1.67)c 
∆EARNt+1 1.3878 
(9.17)a 
1.0217 
(11.40)a 
1.7309 
(12.28)a 
2.1563 
(10.55)a 
3.8686 
(12.99)a 
∆NAt 0.1102 
(1.82)c 
0.2425    
(4.28)a 
0.2346 
(3.25)a 
0.0585 
(0.63) 
0.0325 
(0.24) 
∆NAt+1 0.2316 
(10.36)a 
0.1843 
(12.69)a 
0.1639 
(8.80)a  
0.0579 
(1.89)c 
0.2055 
(4.51)a 
R&Dt 0.4284 
(0.86) 
3.7933 
(9.29)a  
4.4656  
(9.60)a 
2.2087 
(3.32)a  
3.9516     
(3.66)a 
∆R&Dt 0.2720 
(0.70) 
0.3402 
(0.91) 
-0.6839 
(-1.68)c 
1.6495    
(2.85)a 
-1.8372    
(-2.58)b 
∆R&Dt+1 1.1558 
(3.70) a  
2.9313 
(10.27)a 
2.3071 
(6.69)a 
4.4368    
(9.96)a 
1.2851       
(1.51) 
INTt -1.996 
(-1.47) 
-2.2714 
(-2.83)a 
4.5033 
(2.74)a 
-0.3900       
(-1.60)  
-4.7295    
(-1.02) 
∆INTt -6.3947 
(-6.52)a 
-0.4240 
(-2.63)a 
-1.9570 
(-1.42) 
-0.4452 
(-1.90)c 
-1.5937 
(-0.55) 
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∆INTt+1 -8.7490 
(-11.75)a 
-7.3327 
(-11.52)a 
-2.2557  
(-1.79)c 
-5.1342 
(-4.94)a 
-2.1064    
(-0.66) 
DIV 8.2171 
(7.06)a 
8.0803 
(6.75)a 
5.7930 
(4.27)a 
6.0036    
(3.05)a  
1.3753    
(0.57) 
∆DIVt -2.2793 
(-3.84)a 
-2.3762 
(-3.80)a 
-1.8125 
(-2.59)b 
-0.6247    
(-0.38) 
-0.9512       
(-0.50) 
∆DIVt+1 3.0438 
(4.79)a 
3.0138 
(4.59)a 
1.8211  
(2.44)b 
-3.9590       
(3.75)a 
-0.3821       
(-0.31) 
∆Vt+1 -0.0899 
(-14.31)a  
-0.0428 
(-8.29)a 
-0.0625    
(-11.54)a 
-0.0859    
(-10.57)a 
-0.1272       
(-9.11)a 
Intercept 1.2874 
(19.77)a 
1.5745 
(25.40)a 
1.4319    
(16.82)a 
1.42882    
(10.35)a 
1.5296     
(6.93)a 
NB.OBSV 3,223 3,223 2,456 3,223 2,456 
R-squared 23.06% 18.27 % 20.17% 15.16% 19.19% 
